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Introduction
In 2008, the worldwide income from outward foreign direct investment reached an all-time high of US$ 1,283 billion, of which the United States alone had US$ 350 billion and the United Kingdom around US$ 130 billion. 1 This income is generally taxed at source, i.e. in the country where the investment has been made. However, when transferred back to the …rm's headquarter, it can additionally be taxed by the country where the headquarter of the multinational …rm resides. In this case, the OECD recommends choosing among two standard systems of taxing repatriated business income: the tax credit system where foreign income is taxed at the domestic corporate tax rate and foreign taxes are credited against the domestic tax liability, and the exemption system where foreign income is exempt from domestic taxation. Given the scarcity of public funds, one would expect that governments in residence countries around the world grasp this opportunity and exercise their right to tax. However, the opposite can be observed: Several countries including the United Kingdom 2 and the United States 3 have recently switched from the tax credit system to exemption or are considering such a move. These reform initiatives receive intellectual support from the academic realm which may seem surprising because, for a long time, scholars used to favor the tax credit system for e¢ ency reasons. However, as proponents of the exemption system argue, empirical …ndings have altered the view on international capital ‡ows and, thus, the foundation for optimal taxation reasoning. According to these authors, the new view on multinational investment implies the optimality of the tax exemption system. For instance, Mihir Desai (2009) states that "modern welfare norms that capture the nature of multinational …rm activity recommend a move toward not taxing the foreign activities of American …rms, rather than taxing them more heavily". In this paper, I examine whether the case for switching to an exemption system is theoretically well-founded. The superiority of the credit system builds on the classical work by Peggy Musgrave (née Richman, 1963 ) who describes a world in which a multinational …rm al-1 locates its investment projects across locations. At the margin, it chooses between investing the last dollar at home or abroad. In such a situation, full taxation of foreign income after deduction of foreign taxes paid is the optimal tax policy from a national point of view, whereas crediting foreign taxes against domestic taxes leads to global optimality. Musgrave's work (Richman, 1963 , Musgrave, 1969 ) and the following contributions like Hamada (1966) and Feldstein & Hartman (1979) were highly in ‡uential in shaping international taxation agreements like e.g. the OECD convention on double taxation treaties. 4 This view has recently been challenged. The main point of criticism focusses on the multinational's investment behaviour. In the Musgrave model, one dollar of investment abroad crowds out one dollar of investment at home. Proponents of the new view on international taxation argue that this has been proven wrong by empirical evidence. 5 Instead, a dollar invested abroad can be shown to e¤ectively increase domestic investment within the …rm or, at least, to leave it una¤ected. 6 Then, the proponents argue, there is no rationale anymore for taxing foreign income for e¢ ciency reasons. Optimality implies exemption of foreign pro…ts.
In the following, I will restate the proponents' arguments in a formal model which captures the important features of the "nature of multinational …rm activity": imperfect competition, …rm-speci…c advantages and heterogeneous consumer tastes. Firms may choose between foreign direct investment, exporting or not servicing the foreign market at all. Firm heterogeneity allows endogenously determining these decisions (as well as those on quantity and prices) as a function of factor productivity, like in Helpman et al. (2004) . If the …rm chooses investment abroad, part of the production remains at the domestic headquarter and is supplied to the foreign a¢ liate via intra-…rm trade, like in Grossman & RossiHansberg (2008). As a consequence, foreign investment may actually be associated with increased domestic activity and tax payments. In this case, according to the authors favoring the exemption system, a tax on foreign pro…ts unnecessarily reduces the multinational's …rm activity without bene…tting (or even by harming) the domestic economy. The model presented in this paper allows asking whether this view is correct and how the choice of the optimal tax rate on foreign pro…ts looks like in such a setting.
As the main result, the model shows that, even if foreign investment increases domestic activity and tax payments, a tax on foreign income is optimal for e¢ -ciency purposes. It turns out that the standard result proves to be robust in this setting: The nationally optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. The reason is that …rms themselves take into account that domestic pro…ts increase in response to foreign investment. Without a full tax on foreign income, social and private interests diverge. Moreover, I …nd that, if the home country is able to manipulate the foreign price level, the incentive to levy a tax on foreign pro…ts may even increase. 7 From a global point of view (i.e. accounting for the welfare of the foreign country's household), the tax rate on foreign pro…ts is ine¢ ciently high. In contrast to the standard literature, the globally optimal tax system may imply exemption of foreign income. In order to set the contribution of this paper in a wider context, it is useful to consider how the literature on optimal foreign pro…t taxation evolved after the seminal achievement by Peggy Musgrave (1963) . Essentially, the literature has dealt with a number of extensions concerning the assumption of a …xed capital stock (Horst, 1980 , Keen & Piekkola, 1997 , the implementation of double taxation agreements in a strategic multi-country setting (e.g., Janeba, 1995 , Mintz & Tulkens, 1996 , and Davies, 2003 , the role of deferral (Dharmapala, Foley & Forbes, 2009 ) and headquarter mobility (Voget, 2009 ). Moreover, the implications of alternative forms of investment like r&d spending (Grubert & Mutti, 1995) and mergers and acquisitions (Desai & Hines, 2003 , Becker & Fuest, forthcoming) have been considered. For the purpose of this paper, extensions regarding the multinational …rm's investment behaviour and the introduction of a world capital market are most important. If a country is small relative to the world capital market, capital is virtually in…nitely available at a …xed interest rate. Then, investment abroad need not be associated with reduced investment at home, as both investment levels are e¤ectively determined by the world market interest rate. In this setting, there is no need to tax foreign income for e¢ ciency reasons (see Grubert & Mutti, 1995 , Mintz & Tulkens, 1996 , and Devereux, 2004 , for a discussion). 8 However, these studies (implicitly) assume perfect competition and, thus, miss some features of multinational …rm activity which have been stressed by recent empirical studies. Given the literature with its broad range of assumption sets and modelling choices, the question arises which model to choose in order to answer the research question brought up by the recent debate on switching to the exemption system. I have two answers to this question. Firstly, the model should capture all the stylized facts which the exemption proponents have indicated to be crucial for their argument and which the recent empirical studies have proven to be robust. These are …rm heterogeneity, imperfect competition and the simultaneous existence of exporting and FDI. The model should yield that domestic activity may react positively to foreign investment within the …rm (Desai, Foley & Hines, 2005) , and negatively in aggregate (Feldstein, 1995) . Secondly, the proponents of the exemption system themselves recommend a model framework in the tradition of Melitz (2003) for deriving optimal tax rates on foreign income: "This new evidence (...) suggests that further explorations of the application of these models to the question of taxing foreign pro…ts would be highly pro…table" (Desai, 2009 (2008) where the multinational …rm is allowed to allocate di¤erent production "tasks" across locations within the …rm. This gives rise to intra-…rm trade and links the two activity levels at home and abroad with each other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the model and the results for nationally and globally optimal tax policy. Section 3 discusses potential extensions and limitations of the analysis. Section 4 concludes.
The model
As indicated above, the model used in this paper has two building blocks, the …rst adopted from Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) , the second from from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). The integration of these two model types becomes necessary because of the tax focus in this paper which will be clari…ed later on.
Consider a world with two countries labelled home (h) and foreign (f ). In each of these two countries, there are a representative household and many heterogeneous …rms.
Households
The representative consumers in the home and the foreign country derive utility U h and U f , respectively, from a numéraire good y and a variety of di¤erentiated goods X. The di¤erentiated goods are either produced in the home country, then denoted as x h with index i, or in the foreign country, denoted as x f with index j. To keep things simple, I assume that the household preferences in both countries are equal. Therefore, location indices for representative consumers are omitted until misunderstandings may arise.
The utility function is given by
where and are preference parameter, N h and N f are the numbers of home and foreign produced varieties, respectively, and > 1. I further assume that 1 > which ensures that each …rst derivative of (1) with respect to x h (i) and x f (j) describe a utility maximum (see Chor, 2009 , for a similar modelling strategy).
The budget constraint is given by
where I denotes the household's after-tax income which is the sum of wage income, after-tax pro…ts of …rms and lump-sum transfers from the government. Prices are given by p h , p f and unity for the numéraire good y. I assume that all home …rms belong to the home country's representative household and all foreign …rms to the foreign household.
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function yields
The pro…t-maximizing quantities of x h (i) and x (j) can be written as
is the price index. 9 It can be shown that the representative household's utility can be expressed as
where W is the household's wage income, is dividend income from …rms belonging to the household and T is a lump-sum transfer from the government …nanced by source-based business taxes.
Firms
The numéraire good y is produced by …rms in both countries with constant returns to scale technology under perfect competition. Labor productivity in this sector is identical in both countries. The numéraire good y can be freely traded across borders which e¤ectively equalizes wages in both countries.
Upon entering the market, each home …rm draws a productivity level, given by 1=a (i), where a (i) is the amount of labor the …rm i needs to produce a unit of Helpman et al., 2004) . Firms di¤er in a (i). For simplicity, assume that a is uniformly distributed over the intervall [a ; a + ] and that a increases in the index i. Similarly, each foreign …rm draws a productivity level a (j). For simplicity, I assume that the distributions of a (i) and a (j) are independent of each other and that @a (i) =@i = 1 and @a (j) =@j = 1.
In principle, all …rms in the di¤erentiated goods sector are allowed to serve both markets. Since both markets are perfectly separated and the paper's focus is on optimal repatriation taxation by the home country government, I will focus on the foreign market in what follows.
Home country …rms either export their goods to the foreign market (export regime, denoted by subscript E) or invest in own production facilities in the foreign country (FDI regime, denoted by subscript I). In the export regime, the goods are produced in the home country and sold in the foreign country. Production requires a …xed cost of F E units of labor input. Variable costs are the wage rate w (the index of which has been omitted since wage rates are identical in both locations) grossed up by the transport cost > 1. After-tax pro…ts are then given by
where t h is the corporate tax rate in the home country. The individual …rm chooses x (i) given the choices of all other …rms in the economy. It also assumes that its choice has no impact on the price index P f . Then, pro…t-maximizing production choices under the export regime yield a price of
If the …rm decides to invest in foreign production facilities, production is shifted to the foreign country. However, a fraction I 2 [0; 1] of production remains at the headquarter (think of management or technology services; Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, use the term "tasks"that can be allocated across locations within the …rm). For accounting and tax purposes, the foreign a¢ liate has to purchase the part of the goods produced in the home country from the home country headquarter at a price of . Shifting production abroad may lower the variable pro-duction cost, since there is a transport cost related to exporting. However, foreign direct investment involves a higher …xed cost of production, F I > F E . After-tax pro…ts are given by
where t e is the e¤ective tax rate on foreign income equal to t e = t f + t r (1 t f ) and t r is the statutory tax rate on repatriated foreign pro…ts. The pro…t maximizing price under the FDI regime is given by
If the transfer price exactly re ‡ects the cost of the headquarter input, = w, the price p I does not depend on tax rate di¤erentials between t h and t e . 10 The reason is that, at = w, there is no taxable pro…t at the headquarter location. Since variable costs are deductible at the foreign a¢ liate and marginal pro…ts are zero, the e¤ective tax on foreign pro…ts, t e , does not play a role either. However, if > w, part of the foreign pro…t is shifted to the home country headquarter via intra-…rm trade. If the e¤ective tax on headquarter income is higher than on a¢ liate income, t h > t e , this drives up the variable cost and, thus, the pro…t-maximizing price. Put di¤erently, an increase in the repatriation tax t r reduces the price:
In the following, I will allow for cases in which 6 = w and consider = w as a special case.
Finally, foreign …rms have an after-tax pro…t of
and charge pro…t maximizing prices of
Equilibrium
The focus of this paper is on the welfare and e¢ ciency properties of repatriation taxation. I therefore take the tax rates t h and t f as given. 11 Consider the following three decision stages. In the …rst stage, the home country sets the tax rate t r on repatriated foreign income. In the second stage, all …rms choose whether or not to produce and the home country …rms choose between the export and the FDI regime. In the third stage, all producing …rms and the representative households choose their quantities. The decisions in the third stage are implicitly determined by equations (7), (9) and (11) . The second stage decisions are characterized by three equations which de…ne di¤erent margins. At the …rst two margins, the marginal home and foreign …rms make zero pro…ts. Firms with a labor productivity below 1=a 
Before I analyze the welfare implications of home country tax policy in the next subsection, it is worth brie ‡y discussing some speci…c features of the model outlined above. Firstly, only the more productive …rms, i.e. …rms with a labor productivity above 1=a
is demonstrated in the appendix. I only consider cases in which this condition holds. The price level on the foreign market is then given by P f = (
. Secondly, FDI increases output as long as p I (i) < p E (i). Thirdly, FDI may cause domestic activity to rise. Here, domestic activity -measured in labor input -does not decline if I a
Note that, without intra-…rm trade ( I = 0), domestic activity would always decline in response to foreign investment which is why the model part adopted from Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is needed. All these features are backed by empirical evidence. As indicated in the introduction, some authors presume that this changes the conditions for optimal tax policy substantially. This is to be examined in the next section.
Welfare
In line with the literature, I assume that the home country government maximizes the representative consumer's utility U h which is the sum of wage income, …rm pro…ts, tax revenue and consumer surplus in the di¤erentiated goods sector. This implies that the government has two kinds of incentive to levy a tax, i.e. to redistribute funds from the private to the public sector. Firstly, it may want to change the …rms' or households' decisions for allocative e¢ ciency reasons. Secondly, it may want to extract rents from foreigners. Since the focus of this paper is on the optimal choice of the repatriation tax levied by the home country which only concerns home country …rms, it is possible to abstract from the second incentive to levy taxes by assuming that tax rates t h and t f are given (which is also in line with the literature, see Richman, 1963 , and the subsequent contributions cited above).
Firm pro…ts can be expressed as
and tax revenue as
To start I assume that the home country government takes the foreign price level as given. This assumption will be relaxed in subsection 2.6. The tax rate on foreign pro…ts, t r , is optimally chosen if
which equals zero at t r = t h . It can be shown that
14 Thus, the optimal tax system implies full taxation of foreign pro…ts after deducting foreign tax payments. This is the standard results …rstly derived by Peggy Musgrave in 1963. The novel result here is that even though the foreign investment generates income and tax revenue in the home country, the home country government has an incentive to fully tax foreign income after deducting foreign tax payments. Note that this is even true if the home country tax revenue of the marginal …rm is larger under the FDI regime than under the export regime. Higher domestic tax revenue 14 A formal derivation is available upon request.
(at t r = 0) implies that the foreign part of the …rm's tax base is negative. 15 Using E (n c ) = I (n c ), the above equation can be expressed as
where the term in square brackets is the foreign part of the tax base. If it is negative, the appendix shows that
home country government does not take into account the e¤ects of its tax policy on the price level, the optimal tax on foreign pro…ts is t r = t h (full taxation after deduction).
What is the intuition behind the above proposition? If, at t r = 0, tax revenue in the home country are lower if the …rm chooses FDI (as in the Musgrave model), the government has an incentive to increase t r to force the marginal …rm back into the export regime. In contrast, if tax revenue is larger than under the export regime (as suggested by recent empirical evidence), the government has an incentive to subsidize FDI which can be achieved by increasing t r (recall that the foreign part of the tax base is then negative). Finally, if tax revenues from the marginal …rm are equal under both regimes, the foreign part of the tax base is zero. Any tax rate is optimal and increasing t r does not harm the …rm or the economy. Thus, in all these cases the government has an incentive to increase t r until t r = t h . Then, private and social interests are aligned.
The result in Proposition 1 is diametrically opposed to the views expressed by the exemption proponents. From my point of view, there are two potential sources of misunderstanding, i.e. reasons which have led to the mistaken presumption that exemption is the optimal answer to a situation in which domestic activity by heterogeneous …rms increases in response to foreign investment. The …rst concerns 15 To be precise, the tax base under the FDI regime is larger if
wF E . With E (n c ) = I (n c ) it follows that the foreign part of the …rm's tax base has to be negative for the above condition to be satis…ed. the investment behaviour by …rms. It seems that some of the commentators treat the domestic income increase as an external e¤ect of foreign investment which the …rm does not account for in its investment decision. However, as long as there no grave principal-agent issues within the …rm, the …rm will account for it and invest until the sum of the returns in both locations equals the cost of production. The second source of misunderstanding might be identi…ed in the di¤erentiation of marginal from intra-marginal …rms. Seemingly, some commentators have …rms in mind which generate positive income abroad and at home. However, such a …rm is not at the margin, i.e. will not react to small changes in the tax environment. The model shows that marginal …rms have either positive income at home or abroad, but not both.
Optimal repatriation taxes when exporting is prohibitively expensive
In the model outlined above, the tax on foreign pro…ts mainly a¤ects the margin where …rms choose between exporting and FDI. There may be cases, however, in which exporting is no option for servicing the foreign market. For instance, if transport costs are very high, exporting may be prohibitively expensive. In this case, …rms either invest in foreign production facilities or do not supply at all. In fact, one might argue that this is the case in which the arguments in favor of exemption (presented in the introduction) actually apply.
In equilibrium, there are two types of …rms, home country …rms under the FDI regime and foreign …rms, which charge prices of (9) and (11), respectively. Furthermore, the equilibrium is characterized by two margins de…ned by I (n c ) = 0 and (N f ) = 0. The sum of …rm pro…ts and tax revenue is then given by
Again, home country wage income and consumer surplus are not a¤ected. The 13 e¤ect of a marginal increase in t r on the sum of and T is given by
With I (n c ) = 0, the above expression becomes zero if, again, t r = t h . It can be shown that
may thus state
Proposition 2 If exporting is prohibitively expensive and the only way to serve the foreign market is under the FDI regime, the optimal tax system is full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments (t r = t h ).
What is the intuition behind this result? Since I (n c ) = 0, a positive home country tax base requires a negative foreign part of the …rm's tax base. Therefore, an increase in t r increases FDI. The …scal cost of subsidizing FDI equals the return, i.e. higher home country tax revenue, if t r = t h . If there is no positive tax revenue in the home country, e.g. because = w, the tax on foreign income is irrelevant because the foreign tax base is zero as well. A tax rate t r > 0 reduces the income of the intra-marginal …rms, but this has no welfare e¤ect because the …rms are owned by the representative household who also receives the tax revenue as a lump-sum transfer.
Optimal repatriation taxes when home country taxes a¤ect the foreign price level
So far I assumed that the home country government neglects that its tax policy a¤ects the consumer price level in the foreign country. However, the government may take into account that an increase in FDI and a resulting drop in the foreign price level deteriorates the pro…ts of other …rms supplying in this market. This introduces a strategic aspect into the analysis which has, in the context of the model, two dimensions. Firstly, since an increase in home country …rms'quantities reduces the market shares of foreign …rms, tax policy might be used to extract rents from foreign monopolists, like in Brander & Spencer (1985) and Eaton & Grossman (1986) . Secondly, accounting for the price level widens the perspective to the aggregate level. As mentioned above, empirical analysis …nds that, whereas foreign investment is associated with increased domestic investment within the …rm (Desai, Foley & Hines, 2005) , on the aggregate level, an increase in foreign investment crowds out domestic investment nearly dollar for dollar (Feldstein, 1995) . Policy-makers might have the incentive to account for this e¤ect on other domestic …rms when deciding on tax policy strategies. How does optimal tax policy look like when the government takes into account price level e¤ects of its tax revenue? The e¤ect of a small increase in t r on the price level in the foreign country is given by
The …rst term on the right hand side captures the direct e¤ect of t r on prices p I (i). The second term represents the price level e¤ect of a tax induced change at the export-FDI-margin. The third and fourth terms are the changes at the market entry margin of home and foreign …rms, respectively. The appendix demonstrates that dP f dtr is ambiguous. This is because two countervailing e¤ects are at work. Given that an increase in t r reduces FDI and
, this has -ceteris paribus -a positive e¤ect on the price level.
However, an increase in t r also reduces the prices of all intra-marginal …rms under the FDI regime (as long as > w). This has -ceteris paribus -a negative e¤ect on the price level. It can be shown that for small approaching the headquarter variable cost w, the e¤ect of a tax increase is positive: dP f dtr > 0. Accounting for price level e¤ects of taxation, the …rst-order condition in (16) reads > 0, the optimal tax rate on foreign pro…ts t r exceeds the tax rate under full taxation after deduction, i.e. t r > t h .
What is the intuition behind this e¤ect? An increase in t r reduces the number of …rms under the FDI regime. The marginal …rm is just indi¤erent between FDI and exporting. However, all …rms pro…t from an increase in the price level. As a consequence, the sum of …rm pro…ts and tax revenue increases. Seen from a di¤erent perspective, the tax internalizes an external e¤ect which the …rm investing in FDI does not take into account. By having lower variable cost, the price level is reduced which then translates into lower pro…ts for all other …rms. Forcing the …rm back into exporting thus corrects for this (from a national perspective) ine¢ ciently high level of FDI.
The results for the case in which exporting is prohibitively expensive are similar. An increase in t r reduces all prices and therefore decreases the price level. The e¤ects on the marginal …rm are therefore ambiguous: its own pro…ts under FDI are increased for a given price level, but the price level itself is larger and, therefore, pro…ts are -ceteris paribus -lower. An important di¤erence is, though, that if = w the tax rate t r does not a¤ect neither n c nor P f . The reason is that (n c ) = 0 and @p I (i) =@t r = 0 in this case.
Global optimality
By assumption, the nationally optimal tax policy by the home country does not take into account the foreign household's utility U f . Again, it is worthwhile to recall that, in the Musgrave model, the nationally optimal tax policy (full taxation after deduction) implies ine¢ ciently high tax rates from a global point of view. The reason is that the home government considers foreign taxes as costs although, from a global viewpoint, taxes are just funds redistributed from the private to the public sector. What are the e¢ ciency features of nationally optimal tax policy in our model? Global welfare is simply the sum of home country and foreign welfare. The latter is given by
is consumer surplus. Foreign pro…ts f are given by
and foreign tax revenue by
The question arises how t r a¤ects the foreign household's utility. Global welfare W g can be expressed as
I can state
Proposition 4 If
@P f @tr > 0, a reduction of t r starting from t r = t h unambiguously increases global welfare. The optimal tax system implies t e < t h .
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. An increase in t r if optimally chosen by the home country government does not a¤ect home country welfare. From the viewpoint of the foreign country, it increases the price level, reduces the number of home country …rms in the foreign country and increases entry of foreign …rms into the market. It can be shown that, …rstly, an increasing price level reduces consumer surplus more than it increases …rm pro…ts and tax revenue and, secondly, that the loss in welfare due to a reduction of home country …rms'FDI dominates the welfare gain due to increased market entry.
The above proposition has three important implications. Firstly, the tax credit system is not a globally optimal tax policy choice. Secondly, it cannot be excluded that the exemption system is globally optimal. At t e = t h , (credit system), it is still desirable to reduce the tax in order to increase consumer surplus. Thirdly, since the tax credit system replicates the allocation, prices and quantities in the absence of taxes, the above proposition implies that a globally optimal tax system with t e < t h attains a higher global welfare level than in the absence of taxation. The reason is that the market is characterized by imperfect competition. There is too little FDI in the absence of taxation since …rms do not account for the resulting decrease in consumer prices.
Extensions and discussion
In this section, I discuss some crucial issues related to the model presented above and compare the model results to those in the standard literature. Crucial modelling issues concern the transfer price (3.1), implications for the labor market (3.2) and modelling choices with respect to taxation (3.3). Linkages to the existing literature are discussed in section 3.4.
The choice of the transfer price : So far, the transfer price has been treated as an exogenous variable. This may be questioned for two reasons. Firstly, it is often assumed in the literature that …rms have some discretion in manipulating transfer prices for tax saving purposes. Firms would have an incentive to charge the lowest possible transfer prices as long as t e < t h . A natural lower bound of transfer prices might be the variable headquarter cost w h . However, at t e > t h , this behaviour is reversed. While endogenizing the transfer price is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the results do not crucially depend on the actual level of . Secondly, in bilateral tax agreements, national governments often agree on some system of transfer price rules that e¤ectively split the tax base according to some notion of fairness. It is an interesting question how transfer pricing rules can be used to align the incentives for the two national governments involved given the investment behaviour of multinational …rms. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Labor market e¤ects: In the model presented above, it is possible to abstract from labor market e¤ects of tax policy choices due to the assumptions of a quasilinear utility function and the existence of a numéraire good. Assuming quasilinearity of the utility function greatly simpli…es the analysis but, of course, also restricts the model results in their generality. Without a numéraire good which enters linearly into the utility function, wages would adjust to tax rate changes. Similarly, the labor market would play an important role if labor was not mobile across the x and the y sector, if unions increase the wage in the x sector or if labor is taxed di¤erently across sectors. While the precise welfare e¤ects of labor market adjustments due to taxation crucially depends on how the labor market and its frictions are modelled, it is nevertheless possible to give an intuition what the e¤ects look like.
Consider therefore the tax e¤ects on labor demand in the home country. Let L Xh denote the labor input in the di¤erentiated goods sector in the home country given by
A small increase in t r has the following e¤ect on labor input
It follows from (4) and x E (N h ) = 0 that
Furthermore, it is a priori possible that the marginal …rm extends its home country activity in response to foreign investment: I x I (n c ) > x E (n c ). Thus, the overall e¤ect of an increase in t r on labor demand is ambiguous. Endogenous wages might therefore serve as an argument in favor of and against levying positive taxes on foreign pro…ts. However, it seems that the arguments against taxing foreign income are not based on subtle general equilibrium wage e¤ects which suggests sticking to the simpler model version with a numéraire good.
Modelling taxes: A third issue worth discussing is the choice of how to model taxes in a trade model with heterogeneous …rms and monopolistic competition and the question of deductibility. In line with the literature on heterogeneous multinational …rms, see e.g. Melitz (2003) , I assumed that variable costs are labor costs and thus deductible. With certain transfer prices, = w, corporate taxes do not distort the pro…t-maximizing quantity choices. They only distort the choice between the export and the FDI regime. This would be di¤erent, if it was assumed that (part of) the variable cost is capital expenditures. Then, an increase in the repatriation tax t r would -ceteris paribus -increase the variable cost of all intramarginal …rms which would give rise to new complexities. For instance, market entry of marginal exporting …rms would have a positive welfare e¤ect. It is therefore important to note that the above derived results refers to repatriation taxes on foreign pro…ts and not on foreign production inputs. I leave the integration of input taxes and the resulting complexities to further research.
Links to the literature: The results derived above show that some of the classical results in the tradition of Peggy Musgrave remain robust against the introduction of …rm heterogeneity, imperfect competition and intra-…rm trade. They are not a trivial replication of the standard theory, though. It is worth discussing what the framework presented here has in common with the classical one and where are the crucial di¤erences.
The most important di¤erence concerns the question how domestic and foreign activity are related. In the Musgrave framework, savings are distributed across locations. A dollar invested abroad cannot be invested at home -investment projects in both locations are therefore substitutes. In contrast, in the above presented framework an increase in activity abroad (FDI) does not necessarily reduce activity at home. One of the main insights of this paper is, that the desirability of taxing foreign income does not depend on the e¤ects of foreign activity on domestic activity (e.g. measured by tax revenue).
Moreover, capital productivity in the Musgrave framework entirely depends on the location. A dollar of additional investment reduces the marginal productivity of capital in a given location and vice versa. In the framework presented here productivity is …rm-speci…c. Furthermore, the Musgrave model assumes homogeneous …rms whereas the framework considered here explicitly allows for …rm heterogenity. This allows determining endogenously which …rms produce, which ones export and which ones invest in foreign production facilities. Finally, this paper explicitly allows for imperfect competition. This di¤erence to the classical framework is important because a tax on foreign pro…ts is sometimes interpreted in the context of strategic trade policy since, under imperfect competition, national …rms may extract rents from foreign markets and thus hurt their competitors. 16 As this paper demonstrates, a tax on foreign pro…ts is nevertheless optimal. Imperfect competition is also the reason that the global optimality of the tax credit system does not hold anymore. As it is shown above, proponents of the exemption system should argue more with the notion of global optimality than with the national interest.
Conclusion
One of the recently promoted arguments in favor of the exemption system goes as follows: If foreign investment does not a¤ect or even fosters domestic activity, taxing foreign income is no longer desirable. In this paper, I build a model with heterogeneous …rms and intra-…rm trade and derive the choice of the optimal tax rate on foreign pro…ts. It turns out that, even though foreign investment may be associated with increased domestic investment and higher domestic tax revenues, the optimal tax system implies full taxation of foreign income after deducting foreign tax payments. Thus, exemption is not an optimal choice from the national point of view. The standard view on foreign pro…t taxation prevails. However, the globally optimal tax rate is lower than the one chosen under a tax credit system (which has been considered globally optimal in the standard model). This may imply, under certain circumstances, that exemption is optimal from a global point of view.
Of course, the model results should be seen in the light of the many restrictions due to the speci…city of the model assumption. As the literature cited in the introduction shows, a change in assumption is likely to translate into a change in the recommendation for optimal tax policy. In fact, policy-makers are aware of this conditionality; for instance, a US Treasury report states that "[n]one of the proposed standards [of international taxation] …ts all cases and tax policy cannot feasibly be calibrated to have di¤erent rules for di¤erent cases" (United States Department of the Treasury, O¢ ce of Tax Policy, 2007). 17 It should therefore be recalled that the purpose of this paper is to analyze speci…c arguments based on the empirical …nding that foreign investment need not be associated with reduced domestic activity. The paper's aim is to check whether tax exemption is an optimal tax policy response in this economic environment. It turns out that in such a situation exempting foreign income from tax is not an optimal strategy although there may be other good arguments in favor of doing so.
It follows that the above expression is positive, i.e. the more productive …rms choose FDI, if
What is the e¤ect of a small increase in t r on the export-FDI-margin, i.e. on n c ? Di¤erentiating E (n c ) I (n c ) = 0 with respect to n c and t r , gives
is given by
It follows that
is negative if
This equation can be expressed as
> 0 as long as the foreign part of the …rm's tax base is positive.
Appendix 2: Accounting for changes in the price level
In this appendix, I derive the e¤ect of a small increase in t r on the endogenous variables that characterize the equilibrium accounting for e¤ects on the foreign price level P f . The export-FDI-margin is characterized by E (n c ) = I (n c ), the entry margin for home country …rms by E (N h ) = 0, the entry margin for foreign …rms by f (N f ) = 0 and the price level is given by
These four equations de…ne the endogenous variables n c , N h , N f and P f . The total di¤erential is given by 
Solving for dN h yields
Appendix 3: Global optimality
In this appendix, I derive the …rst-order condition of t r for global welfare. Adding home country pro…ts in (14) , home country tax revenue in (15) , foreign pro…ts in (22) , foreign tax revenue in (23) , and foreign consumer surplus given by Provided that @P f @tr > 0, the consumer surplus decreases more than …rm pro…ts are increased (…rst term). The …rst term in square brackets which captures the e¤ect of the marginal …rm's regime switch on global tax revenue is unambiguously positive. The second term in square brackets depicts the e¤ect of the intra-marginal …rms'price changes on global tax revenue which is positive, too. Thus, the sign of the whole term depends on the sign of t h t e .
